Trade reform, macroeconomic policy and sectoral labour movement in China Jennifer Chang and Rod Tyers
Although the Chinese economy continues to grow rapidly, since the Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s there is evidence of a slowdown, most promnently n per capta rural ncome growth. One explanaton for ths s that the relocation of labour from agriculture to manufacturing and services, essential in any growing developing economy, has been retarded. This could be due to policy disincentives designed to control urban congestion, such as the household regstraton or hukou system (Ianchovichina and Martin 2002a) or nformaton asymmetres and transacton/nfrastructural costs (Scular and Zhao 2002) . A further hypothess attrbutes comparatvely poor performance in China's rural sector to economic reforms; in particular, to trade reform commtments n the leadup to and assocated wth WTO accesson (Anderson et al. 2002) .
It s the central hypothess of ths chapter that ths comparatve declne in rural performance is due, at least in part, to a combination of China's adherence to ts de facto fixed exchange rate regime and to shocks that have tended to depreciate its real exchange rate. Most significant amongst these shocks was the surge of (largely illegal) outflows on the capital account
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First published in Garnaut, R. and Song, L. (eds), 2003. China: New Engine of World Growth, Asia Pacific Press, Canberra:231-75. and the associated private investment slowdown during the Asian financial crisis (Yang and Tyers 2001) . Since then, however, numerous trade reforms have been implemented, all of which have tended to encourage Chinese consumption to shift toward foreign goods, so reducing home relative to pre tarff foregn goods prces and hence further deprecatng the real exchange rate (Tyers and Rees Chapter 9) . By definition, a real depreciation must be accompanied either by a nominal depreciation, a domestic deflation, or a combnaton of both. The de facto peg to the US dollar has therefore necessitated China's deflation. When prices are falling there is downward pressure on wages. Even if wages fall only slightly more slowly than prices, however, other things being equal, employment growth in the wage sectors of the economy can be expected to declne. 1 In the Chnese case ths appears as hgh real wage growth n the modern sector but reduced labour demand growth there and hence a 'bottlng up' of workers n the rural sector and reduced rural ncome per capta.
The relevance of ths story to Chna's comparatvely poor recent per capta rural ncome growth performance s examned here usng short and long-run comparatve statc analyss. The shocks consdered are Chna's WTO accesson commtments and the model used s that descrbed n Tyers and Rees (Chapter 9). Ths model s a development of the model ntroduced by Yang and Tyers (2000) . It is a multi-sector, multi-country comparative static macro model, the microeconomic components of which have their origins n GTAP. 2 All countres have open captal accounts and forward-lookng nvestor behavour s represented n the short run va expectatons formed from long-run simulations. The focus here, however, is on labour relocation and the short run consequences of trade reform shocks for the uptake of labour n the manufacturng and servces sectors. 3 We examne the pace of such labour relocaton hstorcally and compare ths wth smulated changes n labour demand followng the WTO accesson.
We observe a reversal n the rate of relocaton of workers from agriculture to manufacturing after 1998 and a glut of workers in the rural sector (Dolven 2003) . Our simulations suggest that the retarding effect of the commonly cited system of internal migration restrictions, known as the hukou or household registration system (HRS), has been enhanced by China's broader macroeconomic policy regime. Indeed, the exchange rate regime, combined with capital controls, appears to have restricted the flow of workers into manufacturing and services by at least 1 per cent per year and nto servces by at least 2 per cent per year.
Urban-rural inequality and worker relocation in China
The pace of rural per capta ncome growth depends on the rate at whch surplus labour s generated by agrcultural change and the correspondng rate at whch workers are accommodated n the manufacturng and servces sectors. It s a common vew that the economc reform of the early 1980s, which brought de-collectivisation and the household responsibility system, along with associated increases in agricultural labour productivity, created a substantal rural labour surplus. 4 Moreover, prior to that reform, wages were not market-determned and there s evdence of consderable underemployment. This was due, in part, to the seasonal nature of agricultural activity, which meant that many workers were left idle in the off-peak parts of the agricultural cycle, yet unable to take full employment elsewhere (Banister and Taylor 1989 ).
An exacerbatng factor on the supply sde n the Chnese case was rapd rural populaton growth n the pre reform perod. Even though the rate of rural population growth slowed in the 1970s and 1980s, the growth of the rural labour supply contnued strongly due to the aftermath of the 'baby boom' perods of the 1950s and 1960s.
5 On the demand side, China's pre reform economc strategy promoted relatvely captal-ntensve heavy ndustres. These two effects tended to rase underemployment n the rural sector in the post reform period, where, although rural communes were disbanded, all workers were still technically employed.
6 The post reform perod therefore carred consderable potental for worker relocaton from agrculture nto other sectors. The subsequent volume of nternal mgraton would depend, then, on economic incentives in the form of urban-rural ncome nequalty and on both polcy-nduced and natural barrers to mgraton.
Urban-rural inequality in China
Income nequalty n Chna exsts between urban and rural resdents as well as within urban and rural areas. It also has a strong regional pattern, partcularly between nland and coastal provnces. Of overall ncome inequality, Lozada (2002) estimates that 75-80 per cent is due to the urban-rural divide. Official estimates of the trends of rural and urban household incomes are displayed in Figure 10 .1. These indicate a general upward trend n ncome n both areas whle urban ncome experenced comparatvely sharp ncreases n the 1990s. The correspondng proportonal difference between urban and rural household incomes is plotted in Figure  10 .2. The comparatively rapid growth of rural incomes in the early 1980s, and the associated decline in urban-rural inequality, coincided with the major reforms of that period that first impacted on the rural sector. Since then, however, urban incomes have growth more rapidly, most prominently in the early to mid 1990s leading up to the Asian crisis in 1997-98, and in the post crss perod.
Internal mgraton
If there were no costs or barriers to internal migration, workers would be expected to respond to the wdenng ncome gap between rural and urban areas by migrating until wages were equalised. Indeed, rural labour markets that facltate ths relocaton of workers have been essental to economic growth in the more advanced countries (Burgess and Mawson 2003) . Although the estimated number of Chinese internal migrants has grown (100 million since the 1980s) these relocations have been insufficient to stem the growing inequality (Dolven 2003) . Some of this apparent growth n nequalty s due to a rse n sklled employment n urban areas. A more controversal porton s due to reduced urban labour demand assocated with real wage growth and to official migration barriers. Together, they appear to have left an expandng labour supply 'bottled up' n the rural sector. The key official barrier has been the HRS.
Introduced in major cities in 1951 and extended to rural areas in 1955, the HRS was intended to deal with the escalating urban influxes of rural migrants at the time of the Great Famine of 1959-61 (Chan and Zhang 1999) .
The associated food shortages continued into the 1970s, only ending in the 1980s (Zhao 2000) . Each citizen is required to register in their place of regular residence, often their birthplace. Moving from rural to urban areas requres a complex and costly applcaton for a transfer to a local hukou. Prior to the reform in the 1980s, this was a huge barrier, as without a proper hukou one would not qualfy for a government job assgnment. Workers who ignored this requirement were denied social security benefits such as housing and other necessities, even food.
Decollectvsaton n rural areas allowed ncome nequalty to soften a little and non-farm rural industries to develop. This, and the household responsibility system that accompanied it, had the effect of increasing productivity in the agricultural sector. Thus, while rural incomes grew, so also dd the proporton of workers consdered redundant. 7 The government began rewardng collectve farms and cooperatves for producton rather than labour employed, so excess workers could be free to look for other jobs (Seeborg, Jin and Zhu 2000) . The marketisation of food also meant that mgrants were no longer restraned entrely by the need to obtan a local hukou to survve. Combned wth the development of specal economc zones and the increase in urban private and informal sectors, the cities were on a path of rapd development wth growng demand for labour. Yet the HRS created ambiguous incentives for migrants. On the one hand, it constrained people with access to land from migrating, since each was now responsible for their own land, which most saw as a form of social security. On the other hand, individuals with little or no access to land or who had specalsed n what were to become low productvty rural actvtes were now less constraned.
Through the 1980s and 1990s the HRS was gradually weakened by policy reforms and less strngent enforcement. Prevously prohbted 'spontaneous' migration to jobs in urban centres was tacitly facilitated and tolerated, condtonally openng urban resdency to rural workers and relaxng some of the strct controls. There has therefore been an ncrease n temporary urban migrants: workers going to cities and towns without official residential status, known as the 'floating population'. Figures from the late 1980s indicate that transients made up over one-fifth of the population of such major cities as Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou (Canadian Immigration and Refugee Board 2002) . Many official restrictions remained, however, including the lnk between hukou status and welfare eligibility, the denial of education for migrant children, and state job availability. In 1995, to re-assert control over internal migration, Zhao (2000) notes that tighter controls were imposed over the legalty of urban resdency and housng subsdes.
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As part of China's urbanisation strategy for the 10th Five-Year plan, Central Party Document Number 11 of November 2000 allows a person and hs or her mmedate famly to obtan urban hukous if he or she has fixed accommodaton and stable work (n a job for more than one year) n the urban area. Urban hukou was also offered to those who purchased a local commercal housng unt (to attract outsde nvestment) and to holders of graduate degrees (attractng professonals). The focus of these reforms was still mainly on small towns and small cities, however. Nonetheless, according to China's Committee to Restructure the Economy (SCORES), during 2001 about 600,000 rural residents acquired urban hukou n these small urban centres. More recently still, a State Council directive indicated that rural mgrants have a legal rght to work n ctes. It prohbts job dscrmnaton based on resdency and orders that urban resdency documents are to be provided to any workers who find employment. A further recent directive ndcates that busnesses should stop delayng wage payments to workers. This is a significant improvement for migrant workers as they often find that they are taken advantage of due to ther uncertan legal status.
Official barriers to migration therefore appear to have had an ever dmnshng effect and the least effect n the perod snce the Asan crss of 1997. Other things equal, then, we would expect an acceleration in the relocaton of workers nto jobs n the modern sector n that perod. Ths is not what the evidence suggests, however.
Sectoral relocaton of workers
The trends in employment by major sector are indicated in Figure 10 .3. The early 1990s was a perod of rapd ndustral expanson durng whch workers relocated from the rural sector to the ndustral and servces sectors. Significantly, while the expected long term rise in the share of services in total employment is borne out, industrial employment fell substantially during the Asian crisis period and failed to expand thereafter. Indeed, the farmng and forestry sector shows annual declnes n employment that peaked in 1993 and continued until 1996. In this period the Chinese economy grew at ts greatest hstorcal rates. Durng the Asan crss and n the period thereafter, however, declines in the growth rates of activity in manufacturng and servces appear to have drven workers back to the rural sector. In the post crisis period this backflow appears to have continued.
Performance since the Asian crisis
Good weather and mproved farmng ncentves brought a resurgence of the rural economy n 1995 and the reform of state-owned ndustral enterprses (SOEs) was accelerated, precipitating substantial lay-offs (Meng 1998) . These changes changed saving incentives, leading to a sudden increase in the private saving rate (Yang and Tyers 2000, 2001) . The contractionary effects of these internal shocks were worsened by the arrival of the Asian financial crisis in 1997, which saw the mostly illegal flight of a substantial part of China's additional private savings, leading to a fall in private investment. At the same time, the slowdowns and currency depreciations in other Asian economies made their exports relatively competitive, so that the dollar value of China's exports grew more slowly than in 1990-96 (Yang 1998) .
Our macroeconomc polcy story begns wth the crss and Chna's reaction to it. The shocks of that period, the rise in the domestic saving rate, the increased outflow on the capital account, and the adverse change n the terms of trade deprecated the real exchange rate. Ths effect can be seen from the following definition of the real bilateral exchange rate, for regon i wth regon j, as the common currency ratio of the price of a basket of regon i's goods and the prce of a correspondng basket of regon j's goods:
(1) where E ij s i's nomnal exchange rate wth j, measured as foreign currency units per local unit and the price index used is the GDP price, P Y . 9 The real exchange rate deprecates when the prce of the basket of home goods falls relatve to the correspondng basket of foregn goods. The real depreciation in the crisis, combined with the fixed nominal exchange rate of the period, necessitated a monetary policy sufficiently restrictive to bring about a decline in the home price level relative to that in the US-a deflation. This was the first in a series of deflations in the crisis and post crss perods.
Shocks that cause real deprecatons also nclude the other elements of China's domestic reform program. By raising productivity, these reduce domestc costs relatve to foregn costs and hence they tend to reduce relative domestic prices. Similarly, trade reforms divert domestic demand away from home produced goods toward mports and so they also tend to reduce the prces of domestc goods relatve to the mport prces of foreign goods. In the period 1997-2001 China embarked on substantial trade liberalisation, a major part of which included the introduction of a duty drawback system on the imported inputs of export firms (Tyers and Rees, Chapter 9). Real depreciations due to such shocks are robust to Chna's macroeconomc polcy regme. But t s that regme whch dstrbutes the nomnal effects of the real deprecatons between falls n the home price level, or deflation, on the one hand and depreciation of the nominal exchange rate on the other.
The declines in China's official measures of the domestic price are ndcated n Table A10.1. 10 Other things held equal, such deflations are contractionary. This is because, even in the most flexible of industries, wage rates are renegotated more rarely than product prces are adjusted. Lags n wage adjustment mean that deflation applies a profit squeeze that retards both employment growth and nvestment n the prvate sector. Consstent with this, real wage growth in China's modern sector has been extraordinarily high since 1996, as Figure 10 .5 shows, suggesting some deterrence of labour demand growth and hence of growth n ths sector. Weaker overall performance of the Chinese economy is indicated by its official GDP growth rates ( Figure 10 .4). These bottomed out in the crisis period at between seven and 8 per cent per year, and have not recovered since.
Snce 2001 Chna has embarked on a stll more dramatc set of trade reforms as part of ts commtments assocated wth WTO accesson. By themselves, these reforms will cause further real deprecatons. Should there be no change in macroeconomic policy, growth and the relocation of workers nto Chna's modern sector wll contnue to be retarded by deflation. In the remainder of the paper we investigate the relationship between growth, labour relocation and macroeconomic policies in the aftermath of the WTO accesson reforms.
Modeling the effects of China's trade policy reforms
Here we simulate the short-run effects of trade reforms n Chna whle accountng for the mplcatons of servces trade commtments as well as productvty changes assocated wth these reforms. As n Tyers and Rees (Chapter 9) and Ianchovichina and Martin (2002a) , we make allowance for idiosyncratic trade policies, such as the duty drawbacks on imports used in the manufacture of exported goods. And, as befits a short-run analysis, we also allow for labour market rgdty and assocated departures from full employment.
Following Yang and Tyers (2000), we use a comparative static global macroeconomic model, within which the microeconomic (supply) side is adapted from GTAP, 11 a mult-regon comparatve statc model n real varables wth prce-takng households and all ndustres comprsng dentcal competitive firms. To this microeconomic base are added independent representations of governments' fiscal regimes, with both direct and indirect taxation, as well as separate assets in each region (currency and bonds) and monetary polces wth a range of alternatve targets. The detals of the model are descrbed n Tyers and Rees (Chapter 9).
Simulated effects of accession policy reforms
A long-run outlook s requred n order that the expectatons of nvestors can be formulated for short-run analysis-investors are assumed to take changes n long-run returns on nstalled captal nto account n determnng short run changes n ther nvestment behavour. Long-run results are also of nterest n ther own rght.
The key elements of the long-run closure are as follows there are no nomnal rgdtes (no rgdty of nomnal wages)
producton and consumpton elastctes of substtuton are chosen at 'standard' levels to reflect the additional time for adjustment in the long-run over the short run (Tyers and Yang 2001) • • physical capital is no longer sector-specific; it redistributes across sectors to equalse rates of return capital controls are ignored, and in China, irrespective of short-run fiscal policy assumptions, in the long-run any loss of government revenue assocated wth tarff changes is assumed to not be made up via direct (income) taxes, with the result that the fiscal deficit expands.
The key pont of dfference between our long-run analyss and that of Tyers and Rees (Chapter 9) s that we represent the effects of trade reforms on productvty. There s a substantal lterature dentfyng ths association (Chand et al. 1998 , Chand 1999 and Stoeckel et al. 1999 . These studes use Australan data on the long-run effects of trade reforms to dentfy elastctes of total factor productvty to protecton level by industry. We applied these elasticities to China's intended reforms, albeit wth dscounts for Chna's lower startng protecton levels n some ndustres and adjustments to account for services sector reforms (Dee and Hanslow 2000, Verikios and , to yield the one-off long-run productivity shocks lsted n Table A10 .4. Although these shocks are appled only n the long run, they are important for short run behaviour (our object here) because they rase the return on nstalled captal and hence they stmulate nvestment.
The results from the long-run simulation are provided in Table A10 .3. They show the expected allocative efficiency gains, reflected here in a rise in GDP, aided by increased returns on installed physical capital that induce greater investment and therefore larger net inflows on the capital account. Home consumption switches away from home produced goods, the relative prices of home produced goods fall, yielding the predicted real depreciation. The prncpal downsde of the reforms s the long-run shft of actvty out of agrculture nto manufacturng and servces and the assocated declne in land rents. Associated with this shift, a substantial relocation of workers from agrculture to the modern sector wll therefore be requred.
Although the trade policy regime of 2001 advantaged food processing, 'other crops', fisheries and light manufacturing, apart from the smaller 'beverages' industry, it is the manufacturing sectors that are the robust beneficiaries of the unilateral trade liberalisation. This is surprising, given
• that the protecton of the manufacturng sectors s also set to declne. Ths result arses because both manufacturng sectors commt approxmately half ther total costs to nputs n the same product category and 10 to 15 per cent of those to imports; and competing imports, even though they are from the same sector, are differentiated from home products (see Tyers and Rees, Chapter 9) . Under these conditions the tariff reductions on mported ntermedates have a drect effect on home ndustry total costs. Reductions of tariffs on competing, but differentiated, imports have only an indirect effect, the magnitude of which depends on the elasticity of substitution between the two. Indeed, for manufacturing, it turns out that the nput cost effect of tarff reductons s consderably greater than that of the loss of protecton aganst competng mports. Cost reductons of smlar orgn are the reason for smlar gans accrung to the domestc transport servces sector.
The reforms result n the most substantal reductons n protecton to Chna's food processng sector and therefore lead to long-run contractons n that sector and n the local supply of ts nputs (especally rce and 'other crops'). The more income elastic and lightly protected agricultural sectors, the 'beverages' group and livestock, expand. Labour is assumed to be perfectly mobile between sectors, so that our results indicate the labour movement needed n order to acheve the maxmum gan from the reforms. In the long run, employment in food processing falls by 7 per cent, in rice producton by 4 per cent and n 'other crops' by 2 per cent. Workers lost from these sectors are re-employed prmarly n manufacturng and servces.
When reform-drven productvty mprovements are ncluded n the long-run analysis, the economic effects of the reforms are greatly amplified, even though the assumed productvty changes are one-off and modest. The GDP increase is almost ten times larger, domestic investment is four times larger, as is the return on installed capital that will drive short term nvestment. Increases n sectoral expansons are largest n manufacturng and servces wth productvty growth n servces havng wdespread effects through ther role as ntermedates. The contracton n the agrcultural sector is much reduced, with the beverages, livestock and fisheries sectors now showng robust expanson.
Smulated short-run effects
In the short run, the standard closure is as indicated in Table A10 .4. Monetary authorities in China, Vietnam and the Rest of the World are assumed to maintain fixed exchange rates against the US$. The other regions identified adopt price level (CPI) targeting. Capital controls are assumed to be rigid in China and Vietnam, but they are non-existent in the other regions. In the labour markets of China and Vietnam, nominal wages are assumed to be sticky. Full short run rigidity is assumed in the industrial countries, while nominal wages are assumed to be fully flexible elsewhere in Asia and the developing world. As to fiscal policies (not shown in the table), government spending in all regions is assumed to absorb a fixed proportion of GDP and the rates of direct and indirect tax are constant, so that government deficits vary in response to shocks.
Three macroeconomc polcy regmes are consdered. The 'standard': rigid capital controls, a fixed exchange rate and fixed drect and ndrect tax rates.
No capital controls, a fixed exchange rate and fixed direct and ndrect taxes.
No capital controls, a floating exchange rate with monetary policy targeting the GDP price, and fixed direct and indirect tax rates (Table A10 .4).
In addition, two different assumptions are made about investment and the services capital stock. In a pessimistic scenario, investors do not see the long-run benefits of productivity gains that would accompany trade reform, and there is no immediate effect from reforms in services trade. In an optimistic counterpart, investors are motivated by the long-run return on installed capital listed in the second column of Table A10 .3. Moreover, drawing on the conclusions from studies by Dee and Hanslow (2000) and Verikios and Zhang (2001) , service trade reforms are assumed to result in the short run bolstering of the capital stock in finance and communications indicated in Table A10 .2. Not surprisingly, the short-run effects of China's WTO commtments prove to be heavly dependent on ts macroeconomc polcy regme and these assocated productvty and captal stock changes.
• • • Indeed, the effects range from the contraction alluded to in the introduction through to a substantal short run expanson.
The effects of captal controls and the choce of the monetary polcy target
In broad terms, the behaviour of the model in the short run with rigid capital controls retained can be represented as in Figure 10 .6. The upper diagram represents the domestc captal market and the lower one the domestc market for foregn products. These markets are lnked by the requrement that, for a balance of payments, net flows on the capital account must mrror those on the current account. Net demand for foregn products (the downward sloping line in the lower diagram, NM=M-X) depends on the relative price of foreign goods. For this purpose we define the real exchange rate as n Equaton 1 as the common currency rato of the prce of home goods to the prce of foregn goods. Net mports depend postvely on ths real exchange rate and negatively on its inverse (the common currency, foregn to home product prce rato). Ths excess demand curve s shfted to the right by an increase in GDP, Y, or a reduction in protection, τ. The real exchange rate s then determned by the balance of payments requrement that net inflows on the capital account must equal net outflows on the current account, KA=-CA=NM=M-X.
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The trade liberalisation reduces τ and shifts NM to the right. With tight capital controls, the current account balance cannot change. The shock therefore rases the relatve prce of foregn goods n the home market and deprecates the real exchange rate. If the nomnal exchange rate s the target of monetary polcy and the home economy s small by comparson wth ts tradng partners (P* s unaffected) then a fall n P Y (a deflation) is requred. Ths must be brought about by a monetary contracton n defence of the exchange rate. To the extent that wages adjust more sluggshly than product prices, the deflation causes the real wage to rise. Were the real depreciation the only consequence of the liberalisation shock, its effects would be contractionary. Fortunately, this need not be the case. The trade reform brings gains in allocative efficiency. 13 However, when capital controls remain rigid and the exchange rate is fixed, these allocative gains are insufficient to offset the contractionary effects of the deflation. This can be seen from the first column of Table  A10 .5. The real depreciation is substantial and the deflation required is of the order of 2 per cent per year. The producton real wage rses by half ths and employment falls. Investment demand responds to the expectaton of hgher real returns to nstalled captal n the future by shftng outward (Figure 10.6 ). The loss of tariff revenue drives the government deficit higher, reducing domestic saving, and further reinforcing the outward shift of the net foreign investment demand (NFI) curve. But the rigidity of the capital controls causes ths to smply push up the domestc nterest rate and so real investment falls. Output falls in all sectors except beverages, energy, manufacturing and transport. Manufacturing gains in the short run for the same reasons it gains in the long run-cheaper imported inputs. Therefore, under these polcy crcumstances the net gans from trade reform are not robust in the short run-at least when pessimistic assumptions are made about productvty effects and servces reform.
If the capital controls are removed, the corresponding liberalisation shock is as depicted in Figure 10 .7 (the results are shown in column 2 of Table  A10 .5). Here, reduced protection also yields a gain in allocative efficiency but this time it is large enough to generate a net gain in GDP, reinforcing the rghtward shft n the net mports curve n the lower dagram. In ths case, however, the absence of capital controls allows investment to flow in, responding to the increase in the expected long-run return on installed capital. The increased inflow on the capital account relaxes the balance of payments constrant n the lower dagram and allows a shft toward net mports. The net effect on the real exchange rate depends on whether the capital account shift, which raises the net supply of foreign goods, is larger or smaller than the ncrease n ther net demand due to the tarff reduction and the rise in domestic income. In this case, the increase in net demand is dominant and the real exchange rate still depreciates, albeit to a lesser extent than in the presence of capital controls. Thus, when capital controls are weak or non-existent, trade liberalisation attracts increased inflows on the capital account in order to mitigate the real depreciation and associated GDP price deflation that are its inevitable consequences.
In the thrd column of Table A10 .4 the target of monetary polcy s the GDP price, so that the nominal exchange rate is allowed to depreciate. This removes the deflation that must accompany a fixed exchange rate and hence reduces the rse n the producton real wage due to the reforms. The GDP gan s therefore almost doubled and now only the processed food sector contracts in the short run. Interestingly, the additional investment and greater employment generated wth the polcy regmes of columns 2 and 3 ensure that real land rents rise in the short run.
Finally, the three right hand columns of Table A10 .4 indicate the short-run effects of the WTO accesson reforms under the same three polcy regmes but wth the more optmstc ancllary effects of those reforms (Table A10 .2) included. There are two key differences. First, investors are motivated by the effects of ncreased productvty n response to the reforms n the long run and, second, services reforms see a short run increment to the capital stocks in the financial and communications sectors. These changes cause substantial increases in investment and, in association, they cause larger net inflows on the capital account; they also boost the construction sector and reduce the cost of service inputs to other sectors. Overall, expansons are consstently larger n these cases as s the demand for the sectoral relocation of workers. These are due, in part, to the increases in total employment that occur because of stcky nomnal wages. The upward movement in nominal wages is slower than that in labour productivity, expandng aggregate labour demand by up to 2 per cent.
Short run sectoral mpacts
The key determnants of the sectoral mx of changes n the economy are the tarff reductons; these reduce product prces n affected sectors and the size of the resulting short run real depreciation, which reduces non traded (largely servces) prces relatve to traded goods prces. When captal controls are tght the real deprecaton s comparatvely large. Traded sectors, such as light manufacturing, are advantaged, while non traded services sectors, such as construction and dwellings, are disadvantaged. On the other hand, when capital controls are ineffective, manufacturng gans are smaller and the non traded servces sectors gan. Processed food suffers because of the declne n ts protecton and other agrcultural ndustres contract as that sector demands fewer local nputs. When the macroeconomic policy regime is expansionary, however, only the processed food sector contracts. And, when the optimistic ancillary effects are included, the decline in the processed food sector becomes trivially small, ensuring gains to the agricultural sector as a whole. This result is quite important since, sensing losses due to reduced protection, the farm sector opposes the reforms. Yet, if the reforms were embraced along with expansionary macroeconomic policy, the farm sector would be a net ganer.
Worker relocaton demand n the short run
The sectors defined for the purpose of our simulations are here aggregated for ease of comparison with the classification of employment by China's National Bureau of Statistics. In facilitating this comparison, it has occasionally been necessary to aggregate sectors in both classifications. The result s the seven sectoral groupngs n Table A10.6. Also lsted are the maximum and average annual changes in employment by sector, drawn from official statistics since 1978. The detailed official record of annual changes n employment by sector s provded n the Appendx. These changes include some of extraordinary magnitude, most especially the growth in employment in the services sectors in 1984. We discount these as due to changes in measurement in that year. There have, however, also been some extraordinary employment growth periods since then, including the service employment expansions of 1993 and 1994. Of course, the services sectors were considerably smaller then than they are now, and so the numbers of workers relocated to acheve those employment growth numbers were smaller than would now be required. Even so, these statstcs suggest that Chna's capacty for the rapd sectoral relocaton of workers has been consderable.
In the same table we show the range of smulated short run worker relocaton demands assocated wth Chna's WTO accesson reforms. In nterpretng these t must be borne n mnd that employment n Chna is endogenous in these simulations. From Table A10 .5, depending on the macroeconomic policy settings, it either contracts a quarter of a per cent or expands by almost 2 per cent. This opens the possibility that, at least in the short run, rural activity can expand at sufficient pace to retain its workers. When we combne the most expansonary polcy scenaro wth the ancillary effects of productivity and services reform (Table A10. 2), the expanson n overall employment permts employment n each sector to increase, as indicated in the final column of Table A10 .6. Of course, there remains considerable redistribution of employment in these results, since the servces sectors expand ther labour use much more rapdly than does agriculture. Since we focus on the short run, we take no explicit account of techncal change n Chnese agrculture. In other countres at the same stage of development this change has been labour saving, enabling the agrcultural sector to shed workers at a consderable rate (Anderson et al. 2002) .
Our contenton that the macroeconomc polcy envronment s mportant n determnng the pace of worker relocaton demand s borne out n these results. In all sectors there s a stark contrast between employment growth under tight capital controls and a fixed exchange rate regime on the one hand and an investment policy that renders the capital controls ineffective, combined with a flexible exchange rate, on the other. When the ancillary shocks to productivity and services capital are included, this gulf widens further. In the case of this most optimistic of scenarios, employment growth exceeds the average snce 1990 n all but two sectors and the excess s largest n constructon and dwellngs and transport servces. These strong worker relocaton demands nonetheless fall short of the maxma acheved in a single year in all sectors, even since 1990.
Yet the WTO accesson reforms are but a small part of the pantheon of China's overall reform program, the bulk of which is growth enhancing. We not only exclude the trend of technology and assocated organsatonal changes, as mentioned previously, but we take no account of the ongoing financial sector reforms and the continuing transformation of urban activity from the publc to the prvate sector. Even n the case of Chna's WTO accession, we take no account of commitments by China's trading partners to reduce protecton aganst ts labour-ntensve exports. These changes wll mprove Chna's terms of trade and stmulate ts growth. Consderng such omissions, worker relocation demand in a more expansionary policy environment could well approach, or even exceed, the high rates of change observed n the early 1990s.
Finally, our simulations rest on the assumption that production and sklled workers n one sector are perfectly transformable nto correspondng workers n other sectors. Because some workers have narrowly sectorspecific education and training and because sectoral relocation has high transaction costs, particularly for rural families, the actual transformability of producton workers wll reman mperfect (Scular and Zhao 2002) . Our results therefore place upper bounds on the economc performance results from the WTO accession reforms and, more importantly for our purpose, upper bounds on worker relocaton demands n the short run.
Conclusions
Our chronicle of changes in economic performance, income distribution and nternal mgraton n Chna suggests a recent slowng of employment growth n the modern sector and the 'bottlng up' of labour n rural activities, widening the income gap between urban and rural workers. Ths has happened n spte of what our revew suggests s a consderable relaxation of the worker registration, or hukou, system that has constrained nternal mgraton n the past.
To examine the hypothesis that the slowdown in economic growth, and the pace of worker relocation in particular, is due at least in part to a restrictive macroeconomic policy regime, we adapt a comparative static multi-product, multi-region macroeconomic model. We use the model to compare the economc effects of a key element of Chna's current economic reform program, namely its commitments associated with its accession to the WTO, under a variety of macroeconomic policy regimes. These range from very restrictive capital controls, combined with a fixed exchange rate, to a regime with no capital controls (or the equivalent in FDI flexibility) and a flexible exchange rate. The results suggest these regimes make a dfference of at least 1 per cent per year n GDP growth and at least 2 per cent per year n employment growth n the economy's modern sector. They therefore support our hypothesis, at least to the extent that the macroeconomc polcy regme has contrbuted to a slowdown n the pace of expansion and worker relocation. Indeed, with an expansionary macroeconomc polcy and optmstc assumptons about productvty effects assocated wth the WTO accesson reforms and nter-sectoral worker transformability, simulated worker relocation demands from these reforms alone exceed the average of Chna's recent experence.
While we are confident about our conclusion that China's macroeconomic polcy regme has reduced economc performance relatve to ts theoretcal potential, it does not follow that we advocate the immediate elimination of capital controls and the adoption of a floating exchange rate. The latter has been advocated recently by government representatves n Japan and the US, including such significant players as the Chairman of the US Federal Reserve.
14 We are more nclned to cauton on the ssue of the exchange rate, recognising that a float would be premature considering China's underdeveloped financial sector, its partially reformed banking industry and ts stll vulnerable state-owned enterprses. 15 The fact that more flexibility would enhance China's growth should be taken as advocating the acceleration of the reform processes needed before a floating rate regime can be mplemented. 8 The effect of these restrictions was to tend to leave marginal urban residents underqualified for their jobs while migrants from rural areas tend to be overqualified. Meng and Zhang (2001) estimate these rates of under and over qualification at 22 per cent for urban resdents and 6 per cent for mgrants from rural areas.
9 Often quoted is the real effective exchange rate, which is a weighted average of bilateral real rates
where Xi and Mi are region i's total values of exports and imports, respectively.
10 The analysis by Yang and Tyers (2000, 2001) suggests that the magnitudes of China's crisis period deflation might be understated by official statistics.
11 A detailed description of the original model is provided by Hertel (1997) .
12 The net factor ncome component of the current account s zero at the outset because that s the assumpton emboded n the constructon of the orgnal database.
13 To see these at least partially offsetting gains in allocative efficiency, it is necessary to use a multi-commodity, general equilibrium framework such as used in this paper.
14 Interestingly, this pressure has tended to be for a revaluation of the RMB, which would benefit both Japan and the US in the short run. The shocks we examine yield real depreciations, however. Were these shocks dominant, we believe the fundamentals are more likely to support a devaluation of the RMB. A revaluation would be justified only in the event of Chinese investment demand taking on 'bubble' characteristics, capital controls notwthstandng.
15 See the discussion on this point by Edwards (2003) .
16 See both Roberts and Tyers (2003) and Edwards and Levy-Yeyati (2003) . 
Notes:
a These are supplementary exogenous shocks applied, where indicated, along with the tariff reductions. They incorporate the findings of other research, particularly on the effects of servces reform. b Estimates based on the results from research by Chand et al. (1998 ), Chand (1999 and Stoeckel et al. (1999) . c Estimated one year effect, based on the results from research by Dee and Hanslow (2000) and Verikios and Zhang (2001) . Sources: Chand, S., 1999 
a The expected future return on installed capital is exogenous in the short run, determned n a separate long-run soluton. There are three macroeconomc polcy regimes for China, with (1) the most restrictive and (3) the most expansionary. b The nominal money supply is endogenous in each case, the corresponding exogenous varable beng the lsted target. c When the nominal wage is assumed flexible it is endogenous and the corresponding exogenous variable is the employment level. When it is sticky or rigid, Equation 2 is actvated and the employment level s endogenous. d Capital controls are assumed to maintain a rigid net inflow of foreign investment on the capital account. When KA = I-SD is made exogenous to represent this, an interest premum opens between the domestc and nternatonal captal markets. Ths premum becomes endogenous. Effectively, the home and foreign capital markets are separated and clear at different interest rates. Where the capital account is flexible (open), this implies that private flows on the capital account are permitted at any level. KA = I-SD is then endogenous and the home nterest premum s exogenous (unchanged by any shock). Ths means that the home nterest rate then moves n proporton to the rate that clears the global savngs-nvestment market. The expected long-run return on captal motvates nvestment n these smulatons. It s exogenous and ts values are from Table A10 .5. Source: Model simulations described in the text. 200% 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
